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CONTRACTING FOR STATE
INTERVENTION: THE ORIGINS OF
SOVEREIGN DEBT ARBITRATION
W. MARK C. WEIDEMAIER*
I
INTRODUCTION
Most models of contracting behavior assume that contracts are drafted with
the expectation that their terms will be enforced, whether through legal or
relational means. That assumption extends to contract terms governing the
method of enforcement, such as arbitration clauses. According to theory,
contracting parties keep promises to arbitrate either because they know courts
will compel them to do so (or will enforce an arbitral award rendered in their
absence) or because compliance is necessary to avoid some reputational or
other extra-legal sanction. In other words, parties include arbitration clauses in
their contracts because they want to arbitrate disputes and because they believe
that a counter-party who has agreed to arbitrate will be unable or unwilling to
renege on this promise.
In this article, written for a symposium on innovations on the sovereign debt
markets, I describe how this account cannot explain the origins of arbitration
clauses in contracts related to sovereign lending.1 Sovereign debt arbitration has
been much in the news of late, primarily due to bondholders’ efforts to arbitrate
claims arising out of Argentina’s 2001 default before the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).2 The reality, however, is that
modern sovereign debt contracts generally choose litigation in national courts
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This article is also available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law. For
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Jacoby, Noel Maurer, Jason Yackee, and to participants at the Modern History of Sovereign Debt
conference at American University Washington College of Law. Thanks also to Andrew Gatt, Natalie
Gominger, and Yuanyue Mu for research assistance, and to the University of North Carolina School of
Law for financial support.
1. This article is concerned primarily with loans by private lenders to sovereign borrowers,
whether in the form of commercial-bank loans or bonds, rather than loans by international financial
institutions or government creditors. Although there have been times when commercial loans
comprised the bulk of sovereign lending, most sovereign debt today is owed to holders of sovereign
bonds, and the same was true during the period of interest in this article.
2. See, e.g., Michael Waibel, Opening Pandora’s Box: Sovereign Bonds in International
Arbitration, 101 AM. J. INT’L. L. 711 (2007).
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over arbitration.3 But this was not always the case. In the first several decades of
the twentieth century, arbitration clauses appeared with some frequency in
sovereign debt contracts.
That these contracts would have addressed dispute resolution at all is
somewhat surprising. As part I of this article explains, one might expect such
terms to have originated sometime in the mid-twentieth century, when changes
to the law of sovereign immunity made it feasible for creditors to obtain a
judgment based on a sovereign government’s ex ante consent to litigation or
arbitration. During the previous era of absolute immunity, by contrast, states
typically were immune from suit unless they consented at the time of the lawsuit
itself. Since any dispute-resolution process would require the sovereign’s ex
post consent, there would seem little point to bargaining over such a process ex
ante. More puzzling still, there is little evidence that sovereign borrowers
voluntarily complied with their promises to arbitrate future disputes. Thus, a
ready solution to the puzzle—that borrowers kept their arbitration-related
promises to maintain their reputations as reliable transaction partners—appears
inapt.
So what explains the use of arbitration clauses in these early-twentieth
century contracts? Part II of this article draws on both original archival research
and secondary-source material to offer a preliminary answer to this question.
Tracing the routine use of arbitration clauses in sovereign loans to U.S. dollar
diplomacy in Latin America and the Caribbean in the early 1900s, it argues that
arbitration clauses often had little to do with facilitating an arbitration between
lender and borrower. Instead, the clauses were designed to encourage, and at
times enable, influential capital-exporting states to participate in resolving
disputes arising out of sovereign loans.4 Equally important, the clauses signaled
to investors—at times, inaccurately—that important creditor states supported
the loan and would view default with disfavor. In their earliest incarnations,
then, these clauses had little to do with facilitating an actual lender–borrower
arbitration. They were instead tools to signify and justify the projection of
power by creditor states.
This article then briefly explores what these findings imply about the
relationship between state actors and contract design. It is widely recognized, of
course, that state-supplied law constitutes a set of implied terms that govern the
content and manner of private exchanges unless the contracting parties agree
otherwise. General contract law, for example, provides off-the-rack terms
allocating risk between the parties, and laws pertaining to dispute resolution
establish off-the-rack procedures for enforcing contractual commitments. It is
also widely recognized that state policies may both facilitate and deter efforts by
contracting parties to design innovative terms. In each case, however, the focus
3. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Disputing Boilerplate, 82 TEMPLE L. REV. 1 (2009).
4. For simplicity, I will sometimes use the term “creditor states” to refer to major capitalexporting jurisdictions like England and the United States, whether or not these states were themselves
creditors of the borrower state.
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is on the state as causal agent—that is, as an external force that shapes private
contracts. But the findings described here serve as a reminder that causation
runs both ways. Contracting parties also may design contracts in an effort to
influence the behavior of state actors and other outsiders to the contract. This
may be especially true of sovereign debt contracts, as illustrated briefly at the
end of this article with examples from both historic and modern contracts.
II
THE PUZZLE OF UNENFORCEABLE DISPUTE RESOLUTION TERMS
A. Enforcement During the Era of Absolute Immunity
Accounts of sovereign lending emphasize that lenders had no effective legal
recourse against defaulting sovereign borrowers before the latter half of the
twentieth century.5 The borrower’s domestic courts were not exactly hospitable
to foreign lenders,6 and sovereign immunity and other legal barriers defeated
most efforts to recover from state borrowers in the foreign investor’s home
courts. Sovereign immunity posed an especially high barrier in England and, to
a perhaps lesser extent, in the United States.7 French, German, and Swiss
courts, for example, enforced ex ante waivers of state sovereign immunity under
some circumstances, though typically only when the loan had some connection
to the forum.8 English courts, however, did not recognize such waivers, and
their enforceability under U.S. law was uncertain at best,9 for sovereignimmunity doctrine in both countries permitted the state to withdraw its consent
to be sued at any time.10 These difficulties encountered by sovereign lenders
were compounded by a further problem: the inability to enforce any judgment

5. See 1 EDWIN BORCHARD, STATE INSOLVENCY AND FOREIGN BONDHOLDERS 171 (1951);
MICHAEL TOMZ, REPUTATION AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: SOVEREIGN DEBT ACROSS
THREE CENTURIES 158–59 (2007). This is not to say that modern sovereign loans are characterized by
robust legal enforcement, only that lenders often lacked even formal enforcement rights until the
adoption of restrictive theories of sovereign immunity.
6. As blandly put in a 1939 report by a League of Nations committee formed to study loan
contracts: “[A]n action before the national courts of the debtor State is not always calculated to yield
the results which the bondholder is entitled to expect.” Report Presented by the Comm. for the Study of
International Loan Contracts at 24, League of Nations Doc. C.145M.93 1939 II A (1939).
7. In some jurisdictions, the principle of absolute immunity had begun to break down as early as
the mid-nineteenth century. For a general summary, see Harvard Law School Research in International
Law, Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign States, 26 AM. J. INT’L L. SUPP. 473, 527–40 (1932)
[hereinafter Harvard Draft Convention].
8. See id. at 548–80; Georges R. Delaume, Jurisdiction of Courts and International Loans: A Study
of Lenders’ Practice, 6 AM. J. COMP. L. 189, 203–04 n.40 (1957).
9. See Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 7, at 549–51; Delaume, supra note 8, at 203–04 &
n.40; Edwin D. Dickinson, Waiver of State Immunity, 19 AM. J. INT’L L. 555, 558–59 (1925); William
Harvey Reeves, Remarks Before the Fifty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law (Apr. 28, 1961), in PROC. OF THE AM. SOC. OF INT’L L. 130, 134–35 (1961).
10. See Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. 527, 529 (1857); Kahan v. Pakistan Fed’n, [1951] 2 K.B. 1003,
1012.
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rendered against the borrower. Even if the lender could obtain a judgment, the
sovereign’s assets would likely remain immune from execution.11
Nor would it have improved matters much for the lender to include an
arbitration clause in the contract. The early part of the twentieth century was
characterized by a growing interest in the use of arbitration to resolve disputes
between states and foreign investors. For example, some of the so-called
League Loans after World War I referred disputes to the Council of the League
of Nations or to arbitration,12 and in 1939, a League study committee
recommended that arbitration clauses be included in all international loan
contracts.13 Yet during the period of interest here, recalcitrant states do not
appear to have faced significant international pressure to comply with ex ante
agreements to arbitrate disputes with private parties.14 Moreover, formal law
limited the enforceability of such agreements during much of this era, even
when the relevant contract involved exclusively private parties.15 Finally, even if
the lender could procure an arbitration award, the award would have to be
enforced in national courts, where the borrower might once again invoke
sovereign immunity.16
For all these reasons, formal legal enforcement was virtually unavailable to
sovereign lenders during the early twentieth century.17 To be sure, sovereign
states and their creditors could always agree to submit existing disputes to some

11. See BORCHARD, supra note 5, at 158, 169.
12. See, e.g., Agreement Concerning Kingdom of Hungary 7.5% Sterling Loan of 1924 ¶ 14 (June
30, 1924). For more on such loans, see BORCHARD, supra note 5, at 37–38.
13. See League of Nations, supra note 6, at 24–27; see also FRANCIS ANTHONY BOYLE,
FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD ORDER 80–81 (1999) (discussing the Convention Respecting the Limitation
of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts [the Porter Convention] at the Second
Hague Peace Conference in 1907); GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND
PUBLIC LAW 50–54 (2007) (discussing evolution of legal infrastructure supporting international
commercial arbitration).
14. This is not to say that there are no instances of such compliance. In the context of the League
Loans, for example, borrowers would have faced significant international pressure to submit to the
specified dispute resolution process. Indeed, in at least one case, a borrower-state voluntarily
participated in arbitration before an arbitrator nominated by the Council of the League of Nations and
complied with the resulting award. See League of Nations, supra note 6, at 25 (discussing 1936
arbitration between Bulgaria and loan trustee).
15. Historically, both English and U.S. law treated agreements to arbitrate future disputes as
revocable until the arbitrator rendered an award. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice:
Community Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 973–76 (1999). Although
by 1889, this was no longer the case under English law, see English Arbitration Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vict.,
c. 49, §§ 1, 2 (U.K.), the doctrine was widely accepted in the United States until the passage of the
United States Arbitration Act in 1925, see Pub. L. No. 401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9
U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2000)).
16. In one notorious English case, a state that participated in (and lost) an arbitration, and then
went to court to challenge the award (and again lost), was allowed to invoke its immunity to prevent
enforcement of the award. See Duff Development Co. v. Gov’t of Kelantan, [1924] A.C. 797 (H.L.); see
also Kahan v. Pakistan Fed’n., [1951] 2 K.B. 1003, 1012 (opinion of Jenkins, L.J.).
17. As late as 1951, Edwin Borchard could write that “the judicial remedies of a bondholder in the
forum of either the debtor or the creditor are exceedingly tenuous and in most cases practically
unavailable.” BORCHARD, supra note 5, at 171.
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dispute-resolution process, typically arbitration.18 Likewise, a state that had
promised to arbitrate or litigate future disputes could always keep that promise.
But while lenders had significant extra-legal leverage, they had little reason to
expect such cooperation after a default. Indeed, even outside the context of
sovereign lending, there are relatively few instances during this era in which
sovereign states voluntarily kept promises to arbitrate disputes with foreign
investors.19 Seemingly, then, lenders whose contracts specified how disputes
were to be resolved were not much better off than those whose contracts were
silent on the topic. In either case, no meaningful dispute-resolution process
could go forward without the sovereign’s post-default consent.
All of this means that lenders relied primarily on extra-legal sanctions to
deter default and to obtain favorable restructuring terms post-default.20 Lenders
also might turn to their home states to represent their interests, occasionally
through military force but, more commonly, through the institution of
diplomatic protection.21 Although rare, such interventions occasionally
produced similarly favorable restructuring terms, sometimes accompanied by
supervision or outright control of the borrower’s finances by the lender’s home
state.22 Although the evidence is mixed, some studies suggest that private
lenders assigned significant value to the prospect of creditor-state intervention.23
18. For references to some early examples, see SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS:
1794–1989, at 484–85, 488 (A.M. Stuyt ed., 3d ed. 1990).
19. As noted previously, Bulgaria voluntarily submitted claims to arbitration in 1936 pursuant to an
arbitration clause agreed to in connection with League Loans. See League of Nations, supra note 6.
Likewise, the Lena Goldfields arbitration of 1930 involved—at least initially—voluntary participation
by the Soviet Union. See Jason Webb Yackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda and State Promises to Foreign
Investors Before Bilateral Investment Treaties: Myth and Reality, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1550, 1574–76
(2009). Some other exceptions are noted in SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS, supra note
18, at 472 et seq.
20. See, e.g., Paolo Mauro & Yishay Yafeh, The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders 9–12, 23–25
(Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/03/107, 2003).
21. For relevant summaries, see CHRISTOPHER F. DUGAN ET AL., INVESTOR–STATE
ARBITRATION 26–33 (2008); BORCHARD, supra note 5, at 217–48. On the infrequent use of force to
support bondholder interests, see TOMZ, supra note 5, at 127–33.
22. See EMILY S. ROSENBERG, FINANCIAL MISSIONARIES TO THE WORLD: THE POLITICS AND
CULTURE OF DOLLAR DIPLOMACY, 1900–1930, at 52–56 (2003); Mauro & Yafeh, supra note 20, at 21–
22.
23. See Faisal Z. Ahmed, Laura Alfaro & Noel Maurer, Lawsuits and Empire: On the Enforcement
of Sovereign Debt in Latin America, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39, 45 (Fall 2010); Kris Mitchener &
Marc Weidenmier, Empire, Public Goods, and the Roosevelt Corollary, 65 J. ECON. HIST. 658 (2005)
[hereinafter Mitchener & Weidenmier, Empire]; Kris Mitchener & Marc Weidenmier, Supersanctions
and Sovereign Debt Repayment (National Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11,472, 2005)
[hereinafter Mitchener & Weidenmier, Supersanctions].
Much of the empirical work demonstrating the efficacy of gunboat diplomacy as an
enforcement regime focuses on relatively narrow time periods. Mitchener and Weidenmier, for
example, focus on the years 1870–1913. See Mitchener & Weidenmier, Supersanctions, supra. Focusing
on a longer time period, 1820–1913, Michael Tomz found a low absolute probability of military
intervention and few instances in which actual or threatened military intervention could be attributed
to the desire to protect bondholder interests. See TOMZ, supra note 5. Whatever the true significance of
gunboat diplomacy for sovereign debt, it is clear that arbitration clauses were initially designed to link
debt repayment to the U.S. foreign policy interest in regional financial stability, and that both bankers
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On still other occasions, diplomatic or military intervention induced
borrower states to enter bilateral treaties establishing arbitration tribunals or
mixed-claims commissions to resolve claims by citizens of the creditor state.24
Although they often declined jurisdiction over bondholders’ claims,25 these
tribunals—which, it bears repeating, presided over interstate disputes—were the
only form of adjudication that proved remotely effective at resolving disputes
arising out of sovereign default. The function of such tribunals, moreover, was
not to produce a judgment enforceable by private creditors against the
borrower’s assets; sovereign immunity would have prevented that. Rather, it
was to break an impasse in settlement negotiations and thus to produce a
settlement that both lender and borrower would accept.26 The interstate
character of the adjudication no doubt increased the likelihood of state
compliance, for the borrower’s refusal to comply with the award would violate a
treaty and possibly invite diplomatic or military action by the lender’s home
state.27 Indeed, the so-called Porter Convention, adopted at the Second Hague
Peace Conference of 1907, implicitly authorized the use of force when a
borrower state refused a creditor state’s demand for arbitration or would not
comply with an arbitration award. Although the Convention forbade states to
use force to recover “contract debts” owed to their nationals, the prohibition
did not apply when “the debtor State refuse[d] or neglect[ed] to reply to an
offer of arbitration, or, after accepting the offer, prevent[ed] any ‘Compromis’
from being agreed on, or, after the arbitration, fail[ed] to submit to the award.”28
B. Modern Dispute-Resolution Terms and the Link to Sovereign-Immunity
Doctrine
This landscape changed in the latter part of the twentieth century with a
number of developments that enhanced private creditors’ access to formal tools

and State Department officials believed that these clauses could justify military action. See infra text
accompanying notes 51–54.
24. See, e.g., Treaty on Claims upon the Government of New Grenada, U.S.-New Grenada, Sept.
10, 1857, 1857 U.S.T. LEXIS 19. For a summary of U.S. executive agreements referring claims to
arbitration commissions, see Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, The Dangers of Deference: International Claim
Settlement by the President, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 26–27 & n.176 (2003).
25. Early tribunals often justified this practice by reasoning that such claims were not interstate
disputes, because states traditionally had declined to extend diplomatic protection to bondholders (as
opposed to creditors who had lost property or suffered personal injury). See BORCHARD, supra note 5,
at 36–37, 266–68; Award of Sir Frederick Bruce, Columbian Bond Cases, reprinted in 4 JOHN BASSETT
MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED
STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 3591, 3614–15 (1898).
26. In some cases, for example, arbitrators might be asked to identify appropriate restructuring
terms, rather than address questions concerning the legitimacy of the underlying debt. See, e.g., 33rd
Annual Report of the Council of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, at 340–41 (Jan. 1907)
(describing arbitration conducted pursuant to agreement between the United States and Santo
Domingo in which the award established payment, security, and other restructuring terms).
27. See generally BOYLE, supra note 13, at 80–81.
28. See Convention Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of
Contract Debts, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2241.
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of legal enforcement. These developments include the gradual adoption in the
United States and United Kingdom of restrictive theories of sovereign
immunity,29 the creation of a treaty-based infrastructure facilitating the
recognition and enforcement of international commercial arbitration awards,30
and the creation of a similar infrastructure to facilitate the arbitration of
disputes between states and foreign investors.31
Given these developments, it is hardly surprising that modern sovereign
debt contracts contain detailed terms pertaining to legal enforcement.32 Table 1
summarizes the results of a survey of contract terms for sovereign issuances
between 1991 and 2008.33 The survey found that over ninety-five percent of
issuers agree to submit to the jurisdiction of foreign courts or arbitration
tribunals.
Table 1: Choice of Forum Clauses in Sovereign Bonds: 1991–2008
Issuers
Choice of Forum
No External Forum

External Forum

Total

Number

% of Total

Cumulative %

No Submission to Jurisdiction

1

1.4%

1.4%

Domestic Courts Only

2

2.8%

4.2%

Arbitration Only

2

2.8%

6.9%

Arbitration and Foreign Courts

5

6.9%

13.9%

Multiple Foreign Courts

5

6.9%

20.8%

One Foreign Court

57

79.2%

100.0%

72

Many underwriting agreements contain similar provisions.34 These clauses
are closely linked to underlying legal doctrine. For example, sovereignimmunity statutes in the United States and United Kingdom recognize advance
contractual waivers of immunity from both jurisdiction and execution.35
Exploiting this exception to immunity, most modern bond contracts include not

29. In the United States, this process dates from the Tate letter in 1952 and culminates in the
enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(1), 1610(a)(1)
(1976). See HAZEL FOX, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 185–87 (2002). For a description of sovereign
immunity doctrine in the United Kingdom before and after the enactment of the State Immunity Act of
1978 (26 & 27 Eliz. 2, c. 33, §§ 2(2), 13(2), 13(3) (U.K.)), see FOX, supra, at 128–83.
30. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention].
31. See Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, Mar. 18, 1965, 4 I.L.M. 524.
32. For a discussion of the considerations involved in negotiating such terms, see LEE C.
BUCHHEIT, HOW TO NEGOTIATE EUROCURRENCY LOAN AGREEMENTS 134–44 (2d ed. 2006); PHILIP
K. WOOD, CONFLICT OF LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 141–54 (2007).
33. See Weidemaier, supra note 3, at 24–32 & tbl.2.
34. See, e.g., Form of Underwriting Agreement § 15, attached as Exhibit 4(l) to Registration
Statement of Fed. Rep. of Brazil (filed Apr. 13, 2007).
35. See State Immunities Act of 1978 (26 & 27 Eliz. 2, c. 33, §§ 2(2), 13(2), 13(3) (U.K.)); Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(1), 1610(a)(1) (1976).
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only choice-of-forum clauses, but also terms explicitly waiving the sovereign
borrower’s immunity from suit, and often its immunity from execution as well.36
C. Evidence of the Early Use of Dispute-Resolution Terms
Because they are so clearly tied to underlying legal doctrine, one might
expect dispute-resolution clauses to have originated in the second half of the
twentieth century. And with respect to contract terms providing for litigation in
national courts, that expectation would be correct.37 Arbitration clauses,
however, appeared much earlier. Although seemingly quite rare in nineteenth
century sovereign loans,38 arbitration clauses began to appear with some
frequency in the first decades of the twentieth century, primarily in loans to
Latin American and Caribbean borrowers.
Focusing on that era and subset of borrowers, Table 2 depicts a relatively
sudden shift in which loan contracts between U.S. or English banks, on the one
hand, and Latin American and Caribbean sovereigns, on the other, began to
incorporate arbitration clauses. As the table indicates, these clauses first
appeared in loans made (or proposed) by U.S. bankers or industrialists in the
early 1900s.39 Thereafter, English banks began to include similar clauses in some
of their contracts, although they had not previously done so when making loans
to borrowers in the region. Often, the contracts envisioned an arbitration
between the issuer and its bankers; bondholders were not explicitly granted
permission to invoke the arbitration process. Perhaps for that reason, the
clauses tended to appear in the underlying loan contract, which governed the
relationship between the issuer and the banks, rather than in the bond or
prospectus.40 In virtually every case, however, the arbitration clause was broad
enough in scope to cover claims arising out of default on the bonds.41 Note that

36. See Weidemaier, supra note 3, at 32–38.
37. The findings in this section are drawn from a dataset of sovereign debt-related contracts, which
is described more fully elsewhere. See Mark Weidemaier, Robert Scott, and Mitu Gulati, Origin Myths,
Contracts, and the Hunt for Pari Passu (on file with author). The dataset consists of documents
compiled from Thomson OneBanker and from a number of financial archives and libraries, including
the Rothschild archives, the HSBC archives, the Barings archives, the Duke University archives, the
UBS library, the J.P. Morgan Library and Museum, the Guildhall library, the Harvard Business School
library archives, and the Willard Straight papers at Cornell University.
38. There are some exceptions. For example, at least some Confederate cotton bonds included
limited arbitration clauses encompassing disputes over cotton quality. See Confederate States of
America 7% Cotton Loan of 1863. See also Loan dated July 21, 1860 between Banque Ottomane and
European Commission for the Danube, art. IX (cited in Delaume, supra note 8, at 192 n.11).
39. Some of the contracts are for proposed loans that were not ultimately made.
40. Sovereign bond issuances of the era included at least three documents: the loan agreement
between the issuer and the underwriting banks; the bond itself, which governed the relationship
between the issuer and bondholders; and the prospectus, which described the terms of the proposed
issuance in detail. For a general description, see BORCHARD, supra note 5, at 18–25.
41. In many cases, the banks also would have held bonds, and the issuer’s default on the bonds
would have breached the underlying loan contract. In that sense, at least, the arbitration clauses did
encompass bondholder claims.
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Table 2 stops in the mid-1930s, around the time that a wave of Depression-era
defaults brought the sovereign bond markets to a relatively abrupt halt.
Table 2: Dispute Resolution Terms in Loan Contracts: 1858–1936
Date

Issuer

Origin of
Lead
Bank

1858
1865
1883
1886
1903
1904
1906
1909
1909
1909
1910
1911
1911
1913
1921
1922
1922
1922
1922
1922
1923
1925
1925
1926
1926
1926
1926
1927
1927
1930
1932
1936

Brazil
Brazil
Brazil
Chile
Mexico
Cuba
Costa Rica
Costa Rica
Guatemala
Guatemala
Costa Rica
Nicaragua
Brazil
Brazil
San Paulo
El Salvador
Brazil
Brazil
Haiti
Bolivia
Brazil
Argentina
Argentina
Honduras
Costa Rica
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
Brazil
San Paulo
Brazil
Brazil

English
English
English
English
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
English
English
English
U.S.
English
English
U.S.
U.S.
English
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
English
English
English
English

Suit in
Lender's
Home Courts

Suit in
Borrower's
Courts

Arbitration or Other NonJudicial Body






















Significantly, it does not appear that either U.S. or English bankers adopted
arbitration clauses as standard terms presumptively applicable to all loans. For
the most part, these clauses appeared only in loans to a subset of Latin
American and Caribbean borrowers. For example, J.P. Morgan loans in the
1920s to Australia, Italy, and France do not address dispute resolution at all;
nor do most of the loans made during the era by the Rothschilds bank in
London, with the exception of some of the so-called League Loans made under
the auspices of the League of Nations after World War I.42

42. On the League Loans generally, see Margaret G. Myers, The League Loans, 60 POL. SCI. Q.
492 (1945).

WEIDEMAIER

344

11/4/2010

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 73:335

Another distinguishing feature of these early arbitration clauses is that they
tended to appear in loans that subjected the borrower to the supervision or
control of external political actors. This basic political reality was reflected in
the contract’s dispute-resolution provisions. Most notably, contracts involving
U.S. banks often called for U.S. political actors either to resolve any dispute or
to facilitate an arbitration before a member of the federal judiciary. For
example, a 1911 loan agreement between Nicaragua and two New York banks
referred disputes to the U.S. Secretary of State for a binding “determination,
resolution, and sentence.”43 Another example, a 1922 El Salvadoran loan
contract, called for the Secretary of State to refer disputes for arbitration to the
Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court or another federal judge.44 These loans
were negotiated with the involvement of the U.S. government under
circumstances that involved a palpable threat that default could result in
diplomatic or even military intervention.45 Apparently to emphasize that
possibility, some of the contracts ominously noted that the bankers could
“solicit the United States for protection against the violation of this agreement,
or aid in imposing its fulfillment.”46
Not every arbitration clause envisioned such direct involvement by state
actors. Loans in the 1920s and 1930s to Argentina and Brazil, neither of which
had much reason to fear U.S. intervention, included arbitration clauses
resembling those one might see in a contract between private commercial
actors. For example, a 1925 contract between J.P. Morgan and Argentina
contained a relatively standard arbitration clause referring questions concerning
the bankers’ rights and duties “to an arbitrator named by the Argentine
Ambassador to the United States of America and the Bankers by common
accord, whose decisions shall be final.”47 Clauses like these, which appeared
somewhat later in the century, adopted a somewhat different conception of
arbitration—one that did not call for the direct involvement of creditor states.
Regardless of the form they took, however, arbitration clauses remained rare.
They did not become standard terms in loan contracts.

43. See Agreement on Gold Treasury Bills, Sept. 1, 1911, § 2, reprinted in Foreign Loans, Relative
to Engaging the Responsibility of the Government in Financial Arrangements between its Citizens and
Sovereign Foreign Governments: Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 68th Cong. 155 (1925) [hereinafter Senate Hearings].
44. See Loan Contract Between the Republic of El Salvador and Minor C. Keith, June 24, 1922,
art. IX, reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 43, at 112–13.
45. On U.S. foreign policy in the region in general, and involvement in such loans in particular, see
ROSENBERG, supra note 22, at 61–75; BOYLE, supra note 13, at 86–94; BORCHARD, supra note 5, at
224–25; John Foster Dulles, Our Foreign Loan Policy, 5 FOREIGN AFF. 33 (1926).
46. Agreement on Gold Treasury Bills, Sept. 1, 1911, § 2, reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note
43, at 155; excerpt of Agreement Between Speyer & Co. & Costa Rica from the FINANCIAL NEWS
(London), June 3, 1905, reprinted at 40 Cong. Rec. 9010, 9013–14 (1906).
47. Loan Contract Dated May 25, 1925 Between Argentina & J.P. Morgan & Co. & The National
City Company, § 5.
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III
CONTRACTING FOR STATE INTERVENTION
What explains this selective use of arbitration clauses? One possibility is
that, despite the modern “absolute immunity” narrative, legal or relational
sanctions were sometimes potent enough to give meaning to a borrower’s
promise to arbitrate. For example, if there was some chance that courts might
enforce arbitration clauses, it could not hurt for lenders to include the term
whenever borrowers would agree to it.48 In addition, there was always the hope
that a borrower would keep its promise to arbitrate, perhaps in response to
pressure from bankers or groups, like the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders
(CFB), that represented bondholder interests.49 To support this argument, one
might cite the handful of cases—primarily outside the sovereign debt context—
in which states did honor preexisting arbitration agreements.50
As is explored more fully below, however, this explanation is incomplete at
best. In fact, the earliest arbitration clauses had little in common with modern
dispute-resolution terms, which are intended to facilitate private legal
enforcement. Instead, early arbitration clauses often served one or both of two
functions. First, the clauses signaled to investors that influential creditor states,
especially the United States, backed the loan and would intervene in the event
of a default. That signal (which may not always have been accurate) reduced the
perceived risk of default and made it easier to market the loan to a skeptical
public. Second, in some cases, lenders may have hoped that creditor states
would in fact be more willing to intervene when the relevant loan contract
already included an arbitration clause.
A. Legal and Relational Enforcement Revisited
For several reasons, an explanation focused on legal or relational
enforcement cannot provide an adequate account of contracting practices
during the period of interest here. First, I have found very little evidence that
states routinely complied with promises to arbitrate. In the context of sovereign
loans, I do not assign too much weight to this evidentiary void, for there is only
48. The creditor in a 1924 English case, for example, argued that an arbitration clause that
explicitly invoked the English Arbitration Act should be interpreted and enforced as a waiver of
sovereign immunity, notwithstanding English law requiring waivers to be made at the time of the
lawsuit itself. See Duff Development Co. v. Gov’t of Kelantan, [1924] A.C. 797, 810, 816–17 (H.L.). The
argument was unsuccessful, but jurisdictions in continental Europe had already begun to recognize
advance waivers of immunity, see Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 7, at 548–60, and the fact that
the creditor was willing to litigate the question at all suggests a belief that English courts just might
agree. (On the other hand, the facts of Duff were exceptionally favorable to the creditor, for the state
invoked its immunity only after participating in the arbitration and voluntarily invoking court
jurisdiction in an unsuccessful attempt to challenge the award.)
49. With respect to payment terms, the borrower could always claim—more or less plausibly—that
compliance was impossible. But no such claim could be made if the borrower failed to participate in an
arbitration process to which it had previously agreed. Such a breach could only be viewed as intentional
and might call into question the borrower’s honesty and the reliability of its promises generally.
50. SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS, supra note 18, at 472 et seq.
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one episode of default (Nicaragua, in 1912) in which I can be certain that the
underlying contract contained an arbitration clause. It is revealing, however,
that Nicaragua’s default was followed by prompt U.S. military intervention
rather than by a demand for arbitration.51 Moreover, even outside the context of
sovereign debt, foreign investors historically have had little certainty that
sovereign states would keep their promises to arbitrate.52
Second, if arbitration clauses were subject to legal or relational
enforcement, it is not clear why lenders would use them so selectively. Issuers
with significant reputational capital to protect, such as France (1925), did not
agree to arbitrate, nor did many high-risk issuers with a history of default, such
as Liberia (1912) and Mexico (1899, 1903). In fact, there is little reason to
believe that lenders favored formal adjudication over other means of pressuring
borrowers in default. (Recall that under no circumstances would formal
adjudication result in any significant seizure of sovereign assets.53) For example,
the annual reports of the Council of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders—
an association of British investors holding foreign bonds—detail the CFB’s
efforts to represent bondholder interests by threatening or imposing relational
sanctions, by petitioning the English government for assistance, and,
occasionally, by requesting or instituting litigation or arbitration.54 But the
reports do not suggest that the CFB viewed arbitration as an especially effective
means to force a favorable settlement.
Finally, as detailed further below, loan contracts in the first half of the
twentieth century often sought to involve creditor states in the resolution of any
disputes. This relatively consistent preference for creditor-state involvement
suggests that arbitration clauses were not exclusively intended to be enforced
through legal or relational means. As further evidence of this fact, arbitration
clauses seem to have been more common in contracts with borrowers subject to
the supervision, control, or influence of the lender’s home state or another

51. See generally ROSENBERG, supra note 22, at 77–78; Mitchener & Weidenmier, Supersanctions,
supra note 23, at 24 n.23. In this and many other cases of “gunboat diplomacy,” creditor states relied on
threatened or actual military force to protect broader political or territorial interests, rather than
merely to induce a resumption of payments to foreign bondholders. See TOMZ, supra note 5, at 152–53.
Thus, I do not suggest that U.S. intervention was motivated primarily by the desire to protect U.S.
investors.
52. As late as the 1960s, the insufficiency of relational sanctions was invoked to explain the need
for a multilateral treaty supporting international-investment arbitration. The explanation was that few
individual creditors had the leverage to obtain an arbitration clause in the first place and that even
these creditors were largely dependent on the state’s willingness to participate in the arbitration and to
comply with any award. See Aron Broches, Gen. Couns., Note Transmitted to the Executive Directors:
Settlement of Disputes Between Governments and Private Parties, SecM 61-192, in 2 CONVENTION ON
THE SETTLEMENT OF THE INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER
STATES, DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND FORMULATION OF THE CONVENTION 2 (1968).
See also DUGAN, supra note 21, at 42–43.
53. See supra text accompanying note 26.
54. See Mauro & Yafeh, supra note 20, at 22; Barry Eichengreen & Richard Portes, Settling
Defaults in the Era of Bond Finance, 3 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 211, 215–17 (1989).
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external political actor.55 This apparent link between arbitration and external
political influence is difficult to square with an explanation focused on legal or
relational enforcement.
B. The Link Between Arbitration and State Intervention
Arbitration clauses may have served a function even if they were not likely
to be honored by borrowers or enforced by courts. One possible function was to
signal that an external political actor—particularly the United States—backed
the loan and would intervene in the event of a default. In some cases,
intervention might plausibly include the use of military force, although typically
only when this was consistent with a creditor state’s broader geopolitical
interests.56 As the century wore on and the prospect of military intervention
became more remote, lenders may have adopted new contracting strategies.
Many of their contracts, however, still manifest a preference for resolving loanrelated disputes as disputes between states.
1. The Origins of Sovereign Debt Arbitration Clauses in U.S. Dollar
Diplomacy
“Dollar diplomacy” refers to the U.S. policy in the first decades of the
twentieth century of “arranging loans [to certain borrowers in the western
hemisphere] in exchange for some kind of financial supervision.”57 The United
States, of course, was keenly interested in limiting the influence of European
powers in the hemisphere—influence that could hardly be seen as consistent
with the Monroe Doctrine.58 Yet the chronic state of default and financial
instability of some borrowers in the region meant that European intervention
was seen as a genuine threat. Venezuela’s 1899 civil war and subsequent default
on its foreign debt, for example, was followed by a joint British-German-Italian
naval blockade,59 and in 1913 English officials convinced Guatemala to resume

55. Dispute-resolution clauses appeared in the League Loans and referred disputes to the Council
of the League of Nations or to arbitration. In either case, borrowers presumably would have
encountered international pressure to keep their dispute-resolution promises. Arbitration clauses also
appeared in contracts of Latin American or Caribbean borrowers in whose financial affairs the United
States was heavily involved. See generally BOYLE, supra note 13, at 88–89. The story may be somewhat
more complicated with Brazil and Argentina, which do not fit neatly into this model.
56. See TOMZ, supra note 5, at 152–53.
57. ROSENBERG, supra note 22, at 2. On U.S. foreign policy in the region, and the ties between
private bankers and U.S. political officials, see Louis A. Pérez, Jr. & Deborah M. Weissman, Public
Power and Private Purpose: Odious Debt and the Political Economy of Hegemony, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. &
COM. REG. 699, 708–21 (2006–2007).
58. See Pérez, Jr. & Weissman, supra note 57, at 709.
59. See BOYLE, supra note 13, at 81–82. The Venezuelan blockade was not necessarily motivated
by the desire to protect bondholders. See TOMZ, supra note 5, at 135–43. That fact, of course, did not
make the intervention any more palatable to the United States. Indeed, it seems fair to characterize
U.S. interventions in the region as motivated more by the desire to promote financial and political
stability than by the desire to protect bondholders. Financial and political instability, however, were
often accompanied by default, and in this sense, the banks’ interests were aligned with those animating
U.S. foreign policy.
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debt service by threatening to collect customs duties by force.60 Such episodes
were deeply unsettling to U.S. hopes for maintaining regional hegemony.
The United States adopted several strategies to forestall further European
intervention in the region. One involved promoting arbitration as a means of
resolving disputes between states and foreign investors. The Porter
Convention,61 proposed by the United States at the Second Hague Peace
Conference in 1907, forbade creditor states to use force to recover “contract
debts” owed to their nationals unless the debtor country refused to participate
in an arbitration or to honor an arbitration award.62 As noted previously, the
Convention had a dual effect. By obliging creditor states to submit their
citizens’ contract claims to international arbitration, the Convention gave
borrower states some protection against the use of force.63 On the other hand,
the Convention implicitly authorized the use of force when the borrower would
not arbitrate.
The second strategy, articulated in the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe
Doctrine, was to assert that the United States possessed an “international police
power” that entitled it to intervene “into the domestic affairs of Latin American
and Caribbean countries delinquent in the payment of their public debts, in
order to forestall intervention by European creditor states.”64 In keeping with
this policy, the United States embarked on a policy of financial reform in the
region under which it arranged for private loans conditioned on the borrower’s
agreement to submit to some form of financial supervision.65
Although it bears no explicit relationship to arbitration, this brief and
simplified history explains the initial inclusion of arbitration clauses in contracts
employed by U.S. bankers. For the bankers, the backing of the U.S.
government was necessary to market the bonds to a skeptical public.66 One
possibility was for the U.S. government to enter a customs-receivership
convention with the borrower state, under which the United States would
collect customs revenues and ensure that these funds were used to repay the
loan.67 Such an arrangement would virtually ensure repayment, for any effort by
the borrower to disrupt the collection of customs duties would surely provoke a
forceful reaction by the United States. Yet such explicitly interventionist
arrangements were controversial, and the Senate withheld approval from some
receivership conventions, including those planned in connection with loans to

60. See generally TOMZ, supra note 5, at 132–33; D. H. Dinwoodie, Dollar Diplomacy in Light of
the Guatemalan Loan Project, 1900–1913, 26 AMERICAS 237 (1970).
61. See Convention Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of
Contract Debts, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2241.
62. See id. at art. I.
63. BOYLE, supra note 13, at 80.
64. See id. at 89.
65. See ROSENBERG, supra note 22, at 31–96; Pérez, Jr. & Weissman, supra note 57, at 710–17.
66. See id. at 73.
67. See id. at 41–47.
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Nicaragua and Honduras.68 As a result, U.S. banks, with the active participation
of the State Department, turned to private contract to achieve a similar degree
of financial control.69
Beginning as early as 1904, U.S. bankers began to include arbitration clauses
in proposed loans that were clearly and rather transparently designed to
facilitate U.S. intervention after a default. For example, a proposed loan to
Costa Rica called for disputes to be resolved by the Permanent Court of
Arbitration or a panel of three arbitrators and noted, in addition, that
bondholders could “apply to the United States of America for protection
against any violation of, or for aid in the enforcement of the agreement.”70
Through such contracts, banks sought to harness the “international police
power” claimed by the Roosevelt Corollary by linking repayment of the loan to
U.S. foreign policy in the region.71
Apparently recognizing that U.S. foreign policy might favor intervention in
some cases, the State Department concluded that arbitration clauses might
provide a justification should intervention become necessary. After all, the
Porter Convention authorized creditor states to use force when a borrower
country refused to arbitrate. In connection with a proposed loan to Honduras,
State Department officials suggested that the bankers include an arbitration
clause that authorized the Secretary of State to appoint an umpire to resolve
disputes.72 In the State Department’s view, the involvement of the Secretary of
State would “lend more political significance to the arbitration clause.”73
Indeed, J. Reuben Clark, solicitor for the State Department, reportedly
informed the bankers that a borrower’s refusal to participate in an arbitration
might justify the use of military force. According to Clark, the clear inference
from the Porter Convention was that “this Government would have the
right . . . to use force in behalf of the Americans making the loan.”74 These
discussions make plain what is only suggested by the literal contract language:
these early arbitration clauses were not designed to produce a formal

68. See supra note 43 and accompanying text; ROSENBERG, supra note 22, at 68–70.
69. See ROSENBERG, supra note 22, at 73–75.
70. Extract of loan contract printed in Cong. Rec., supra note 46, at 9011.
71. For example, at least one of the banks proposing a loan to Guatemala in 1909 and 1910
explicitly noted the Roosevelt Corollary’s implications for loan enforcement in communications with
the State Department. See Dinwoodie, supra note 60, at 240–44, 252; see also 33rd Annual Report of
Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, supra note 26, at 23 (noting, in connection with the proposed
loan to Costa Rica discussed at supra note 70, that post-default intervention was “no more than [the
U.S.] government has stated it is their duty to do if the principles of the Monroe Doctrine are to be
brought into line with the march of events”).
72. See Memorandum of Mr. Pierrepont of the Div. of Latin-American Affairs of the Dep’t of
State Concerning an Interview with the Agent of Hond., 1912 FOR. REL. U.S. at 616 (June 11, 1912).
73. Id.
74. Id. See also Pérez, Jr. & Weissman, supra note 57, at 710 (noting that, after the announcement
of the Roosevelt Corollary, the United States “increasingly resorted to military and political
intervention to force the repayment of foreign debt”).
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adjudication. Instead, they were a “means of signaling the U.S. government’s
potentially forcible backing of the loan.”75
2. English Banks and Low(er) Risk Borrowers: Arbitration’s Use in Other
Contexts
Beginning in the 1920s, arbitration clauses also began to appear in loans
made by English banks and in loans to borrowers, such as Argentina and Brazil,
that had little reason to fear heavy-handed intervention by creditor states.76
Beginning in 1922, for example, the Rothschilds bank in London included
arbitration clauses in some loans to Brazil. Likewise, J.P. Morgan in New York
included arbitration clauses in loan contracts with Argentina in the 1920s,
although not in contracts with a number of other borrowers. What explains the
extension of arbitration to this new context?
There is no easy answer to this question, not least because the contracts at
issue involve different borrowers, different banks, and different legal and
geopolitical contexts. One possibility is that English banks modeled their
arbitration clauses on similar terms developed in connection with the League
Loans issued after World War I. For example, the arbitration clause in a 1925
loan contract between Rothschilds and Brazil is virtually identical to clauses
that appeared in the bank’s loans to Czechoslovakia in 1922 and to Hungary in
1924. This suggests that arbitration clauses developed by the League of Nations
for post-war European reconstruction loans may have been transplanted into
other sovereign-lending contexts. The expanded use of arbitration also may
suggest that lenders and borrowers had begun to take seriously the idea that
private, consensual dispute-resolution procedures could resolve disputes arising
out of sovereign loans. Indeed, even before the widespread adoption of
restrictive theories of sovereign immunity, both borrowers and creditor states
had reason to favor a system of international arbitration. Borrowers who agreed
to arbitrate could effectively insulate themselves from the threat of military
intervention.77 And by supporting international arbitration, creditor states may
have found it easier to resist demands for military or other costly forms of
intervention on behalf of citizens disappointed by their foreign investments.
By the mid-1920s, then, arbitration may have begun to gain currency as a
means of resolving disputes arising out of sovereign loans. At least one other
source of evidence, however, cautions against assigning too much significance to
this development. Indeed, there is reason to believe that lenders continued to
view dispute-resolution terms, at least in part, as a means to harness the
enforcement capacity of creditor states.

75. ROSENBERG, supra note 22, at 74. This use of arbitration clauses continued until the early
1920s. For example, loans to Honduras and El Salvador in 1922 and 1923 included such clauses. See
ROSENBERG, supra note 22, at 109–10; supra tbl.2.
76. See supra tbl.2; ROSENBERG, supra note 22, at 62.
77. See BOYLE, supra note 13, at 80–81.
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3. A Lasting Preference for Harnessing State Enforcement Power
In 1957, Georges Delaume noted a curious feature of some recent sovereign
debt contracts: their dispute-resolution terms seemed utterly inadequate to the
task of structuring an adjudication involving a sovereign borrower. Some of the
contracts called for a dispute-resolution process that could not have gone
forward even if the borrower had been willing to participate. For example,
French bonds issued in Switzerland and the Netherlands in 1939 required
France to “undertake[] to subject any disputes” to the jurisdiction of the
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), the predecessor to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ).78 Yet the PCIJ’s jurisdiction extended only
to disputes between states, meaning that, unless the Swiss or Dutch
governments espoused their citizens’ claims, bondholders would have no
contractually approved forum in which to press their claims.79 Similarly, bonds
issued in Switzerland in the 1940s and 1950s provided that bondholder disputes
would be resolved “exclusively” by the ICJ or, “in default thereof,” by the Swiss
Federal Tribunal.80 Delaume dismissed these as “sham provisions” that would
merely “confer jurisdiction upon the Swiss Court.”81 So why provide for
“exclusive” ICJ jurisdiction in the first place?
I am less willing to attribute such irrationality to the drafters of these
contracts, who were surely aware of the jurisdictional requirements for the
relevant international tribunals. Indeed, their contracts bear a functional
resemblance to the arbitration clauses that appeared in loan contracts twenty to
thirty years earlier, in that each contract reveals a preference for involving state
actors in the resolution of any disputes. To the extent there are differences,
these may reflect the different geopolitical contexts in which the various
contracts were drafted.
For loans to Latin American and Caribbean borrowers in the early 1900s,
U.S. military intervention was a very real possibility. In that context, early loan
contracts employed arbitration as a means to both signal and justify heavyhanded, post-default intervention in the borrower’s affairs. As the century wore
on, private lenders had less reason to anticipate that creditor states would
employ such direct means of controlling sovereign borrowers.82 Yet they had
some reason to hope that creditor states might espouse their citizens’ claims
before international tribunals like the ICJ.
In fact, it seems likely that the clauses that so puzzled Delaume originated in
loans that had been guaranteed by the lender’s home state.83 In such loans, the

78. See Delaume, supra note 8, at 205.
79. See League of Nations Committee for the Study of International Loan Contracts, II Econ. &
Fin. 1939 II A, 25.
80. See id. at 206.
81. Id.
82. See TOMZ, supra note 5, at 117; see also ROSENBERG, supra note 22, at 122–50 (discussing the
increasingly controversial nature of dollar diplomacy).
83. See Delaume, supra note 8, at 206 n.46.
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guarantor state’s own liability for the debt surely would have induced it to
invoke the ICJ’s jurisdiction after a default.84 But the clause did not lose its
value simply because the lender’s home state had not guaranteed the loan.
Although lenders were not entitled to have their home states espouse their
claims, it was hardly inconceivable that the states might choose to do so.
Indeed, disputes under loan contracts from the late 1920s had already been
resolved by the PCIJ, apparently notwithstanding the absence of disputeresolution provisions in the underlying loan contract.85 When seeking the
intervention of its home state, surely it could only strengthen the lender’s hand
to obtain the borrower’s advance agreement that the ICJ was an appropriate
forum, along with its promise to do whatever was necessary to invoke the
court’s jurisdiction.86
Thus, it is possible that lenders hoped these clauses would increase their
home states’ willingness to espouse their claims and, if necessary, to invoke the
jurisdiction of the relevant international tribunal. These hopes may not have
been realized. In the mid-1950s, the ICJ clause dropped out of bonds issued in
Switzerland in favor of a clause that provided for litigation in Swiss courts.87 Yet
the change serves to emphasize that dispute-resolution terms must be
understood in light of the enforcement options that are actually available to
creditors. Given the limits to what could be accomplished through private
adjudication, lenders may have been attracted to terms that offered even
modest hope for intervention by creditor states. On that score, it is noteworthy
that the contracts noted by Delaume conferred primary jurisdiction on the ICJ
even though Swiss courts, unlike those in England and (perhaps) the United
States, recognized and enforced ex ante submission to jurisdiction clauses.88
Arguably, then, these contracts manifest a preference among lenders for
treating disputes between private bondholders and state borrowers as interstate
disputes. In that sense, they are functionally related to earlier arbitration
clauses that were (more coarsely) intended simply to justify post-default
military intervention. They also lend credence to the notion that, to the extent
possible, lenders sought to use contract terms in ways that would allow them to
tap into the enforcement capacity of creditor states.

84. See id.
85. See Case Concerning the Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France (Serb. v. Fr.),
1929 P.C.I.J. 20 (July 12, 1929); Case Concerning the Payment in Gold of Brazilian Federal Loans
Contracted in France (Braz. v. Fr.), 1929 P.C.I.J. 21 (July 12, 1929).
86. Viewed in this light, the clause that most puzzled Delaume—within French bonds that provided
only for PCIJ jurisdiction—is not so puzzling after all. The French government had previously invoked
PCIJ jurisdiction on behalf of its citizens who held bonds issued by other countries. See Case
Concerning the Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France (Serb. v. Fr.), 1929 P.C.I.J. 20 (July
12, 1929); Case Concerning Payment of Brazilian Loans Contracted in France (Braz. v. Fr.), 1929
P.C.I.J. 20 (July 12, 1929). Under the circumstances, it would have been difficult for France credibly to
object to having the PCIJ resolve disputes arising out of French bonds.
87. See Delaume, supra note 8, at 206–07 (describing 1955 Australian bonds issued in Switzerland).
88. See Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 7.
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IV
CONTRACTS AS TOOLS TO SHAPE STATE BEHAVIOR
If the foregoing story is correct, then dispute-resolution terms during the era
of absolute immunity bear only modest resemblance to similar terms today.
Instead of facilitating legal enforcement by private actors, dispute-resolution
terms were seemingly designed to signal that default might result in
intervention by creditor states and, in some cases, to increase the likelihood that
such intervention would occur. As the century wore on, no doubt, contracts
increasingly employed dispute-resolution clauses in the hope of prompting a
formal adjudication. That transition is itself worthy of study, not least because it
cannot be attributed solely to changes in the law of sovereign immunity.89
Rather than explore that transition here, I close by exploring what the
contracting practices described in this article suggest about the relationship
between state actors and contract design.
For the most part, contract theory focuses on the state’s causal influence on
contract design. General contract law, for example, is understood as a set of
implied terms allocating risk between the parties, just as the evidentiary and
procedural rules governing litigation constitute default procedures for enforcing
contractual commitments.90 Much of the relevant literature, then, focuses on
how these state-supplied preformulations shape contracting practices91 and on
the ways in which state actors can mandate or facilitate solutions to the
coordination problems that sometimes plague private contracts.92 Yet early
sovereign debt contracts illustrate a rather different dynamic, one in which
contract terms seek to influence the behavior of state actors and other outsiders
to the contract.
As it turns out, it may be quite common for contracting parties to structure
contracts in an effort to influence third-party behavior. Indeed, given the
importance of relational sanctions in sovereign borrowing, it is plausible to
assume that such terms appear with some frequency in sovereign debt contracts.
The essence of relational enforcement, after all, is that promise-breaking results
in the imposition of sanctions by members of some community.93 In a world of

89. As noted previously, both borrower and creditor states may have had some reason to favor a
system of international arbitration. Certainly the creation of such a system would have been consistent
with the broader effort to fashion a workable system of international adjudication. On this effort more
generally, see BOYLE, supra note 13.
90. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of
the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261 (1985); Robert E.
Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814 (2004–2005).
91. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, supra note 90, at 289–305 (exploring how state-supplied default rules
may impede the development of express terms); Scott & Triantis, supra note 90 (exploring how the
anticipated enforcement mechanism shapes contracting practices).
92. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Mandate and Market: Contract Transition in the Shadow of the
International Order, 53 EMORY L.J. 691 (2004).
93. See Mitu Gulati & George Triantis, Contracts Without Law: Sovereign Versus Corporate Debt,
75 U. CIN. L. REV. 977, 988 (2006–2007).
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relational enforcement, terms that induce third parties to monitor and punish
noncompliance can maximize contract value.
This possibility has been noted in connection with terms in some modern
sovereign debt contracts. Thus, Mitu Gulati and George Triantis explain the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) clause, in which borrowers promise to
maintain their membership in the IMF, as an effort to exploit the IMF’s
superior monitoring and control abilities.94 They argue that sovereign bonds
include such terms “to compel the IMF to participate in the creditors’ private
lending relationship with the sovereign.”95 In that same vein, I offer another
brief, historical example of a sovereign debt contract term that derives much of
its value from its impact on third parties, including creditor states.
Many nineteenth-century sovereign loans provided that the borrower would
set aside a particular stream of income as “security” for the loan.96 These
contracts often did not create a formal security interest and amounted, instead,
merely to a promise to earmark certain funds for use in repaying the loan. That
is, the borrower promised “notionally to hive off the specified asset or revenue
stream from the debtor’s general property and to treat the foreign debtholders
as having a preferential interest in those funds.”97 Such clauses may have
benefited bondholders in a fairly direct fashion, as by freeing payment from the
vicissitudes of the state’s budgeting process.98 Yet they also, and perhaps more
importantly, shaped the behavior of two sets of important external actors.
First, earmarking clauses may have influenced investors by signaling—
perhaps falsely—that the loan was a relatively low-risk venture, akin to a
secured loan to a private borrower with pledged assets located in the investor’s
jurisdiction.99 There is in fact some evidence that these security provisions were
used in bonds issued by countries unfamiliar to many bondholders to render
those bonds marketable.100 There is also evidence that banks were reluctant to

94.
95.
96.
97.

See id. at 1001.
Id.
See generally Delaume, supra note 8, at 86–93.
Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, 53
EMORY L.J. 869, 907 (2004).
98. See Ernst H. Feilchenfeld et al., Priority Problems in Public Debt Settlements, 30 COLUM. L.
REV. 1115, 1125 (1930).
99. See Buchheit & Pam, supra note 97, at 907 (referring “charitably” to offering circulars that
touted such terms as employing “figures of speech”); Ernst H. Feilchenfeld, Rights and Remedies of
Foreign Bondholders, in 2 BONDS AND BONDHOLDERS: RIGHTS AND REMEDIES, WITH FORMS 180
(Sylvester E. Quindry ed., 1934) (referring to the “unsound psychology” generated by these
provisions).
100. See Feilchenfeld, supra note 99, at 180. This signaling function is analogous to that served by
the provision, in the 1911 Nicaraguan loan contract mentioned earlier, confirming that the bankers
“have the right to solicit the United States for protection against the violation of this agreement, or aid
in imposing its fulfillment.” See supra note 43 and accompanying text. The term itself served no
governance function in the lending relationship, as the borrower was no doubt aware of the possibility
of U.S. intervention. It did, however, permit the bankers to market the bonds by emphasizing that the
U.S. government would intervene in the event of a default. See Senate Hearings, supra note 43.

WEIDEMAIER

Fall 2010]

11/4/2010

CONTRACTING FOR STATE INTERVENTION

355

underwrite issuances they perceived to be risky without some form of security,
as default could negatively impact a bank’s reputation among investors.101
Second, and much like the dispute-resolution clauses discussed earlier,
earmarking clauses allowed bondholders to tap into the enforcement capacity
of their home states. This is because, although bondholders could rarely
foreclose on state assets, creditor states may have been more willing to
intervene diplomatically on behalf of lenders whose contracts contained a
specific pledge of revenues or assets.102 Indeed, creditor states intervened on a
number of occasions to protect lenders’ rights in some pledged revenue
stream.103 In some cases, creditor states also prevented the issuance of new
bonds that would have disrupted the priority that an earmark granted to
existing bondholders.104
V
CONCLUSION
The rather cursory example of “earmarking” funds to repay a loan
emphasizes an important point that animates recent contracts scholarship:
parties structure their contracts in ways that reflect the anticipated means of
enforcement.105 That insight, in turn, helps explain the use of dispute-resolution
provisions during the era of absolute immunity. During that era, lenders
sometimes had sufficient leverage to obtain a resumption in payments or
satisfactory settlement after a default. But when they did not, effective “dispute
resolution” rarely meant formal adjudication. It meant, instead, that a favorable
resolution occurred after the intervention of some external political actor,
typically the creditor’s home state. This basic reality may explain the apparent
puzzle of why some sovereign debt contracts included seemingly unenforceable
dispute-resolution terms. It appears that these terms were included because
they signaled that creditor states backed the loan and, sometimes, in the hope
that creditor states might be willing to intervene on behalf of disappointed
investors.

101. Correspondence in the J.P. Morgan archives, for example, reveals internal debate over whether
to participate in a 1914 issuance of unsecured Argentine debt, with the bank initially unwilling to “stand
sponsor” for the loan. See Telegram from J.P. Morgan & Co. to H.P. Davidson, Esq., Dec. 21, 1914 (on
file with author).
102. BORCHARD, supra note 5, at 98.
103. See BORCHARD, supra note 5, at 98.
104. See BORCHARD, supra note 5, at 96–97.
105. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 90.

